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ABSTRACT
On the basis of a single-stage Phillips-curve monetary policy game with extrinsic uncertainty we
derive several propositions concerning the relationship between cen[ral bank independence and
(the variance of) output and inflation. These propositions are tested for twelve industrial countries
for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1991).
in testing the game-theoretic model, we use several central bank independence measures based on
the central bank laws of the sample countries.
1EL Classification Numbers: C72, E58l
1 [NTRODl1C"I'ION'
Recently, there has been worldwide interest in examining the scope for greater monetary
policy autonomy for the central bank. At the EC-summit in Maastricht in December 1991 a
Treaty on European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was agrt~d upon. According to this
treaty, in the final stage of EMU - i.e. by 1997 or later - the European Central Bank is supposed
to assume unlimited responsibility for monetary policy. Broadly speaking, according to Alesina
and Grilli (1991), the accepted Statute guarantees a central bank as independent from national
and European political institutions as the Bundesbank. Furthermore, in the Pacific Basin
Countries the same tendency can be discerned. Since the end of 1989 governor Mieno
strengthent~ the position of the Bank of Japan with respect to the Ministry of Finance, while
New-Zealand enacted legislation in February 1990 that increased the independence of its Reserve
Bank. Finally, in Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have been conside-
ring proposals concerning central bank independence. t
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin in the ongoing 'Rules
versus Discretion' debate. Authors like Barro and Gordon (1983a) and Rogoff (1985) argue that-
governments and central banks are tempted to impart an inflationary bias to the economy;
thereby sacrificing long-term welfare to shon-run political gains. The associated time-consistency-
problem can be overcome by legislative rules and by setting up politically independent central
banks. Hence, one would expect countries with independent central banks to have a lower-
sustainable rate of inflation. -
Unlike the well-developed theoretical Iiterature,2 there are only a few studies that compare
actual monetary regimes between a large number of countries. The most comprehensive studies
are Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1991), Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993). Focusing on more
recent studies, it is striking that the conclusions of the latter are less clear-cut than the theoretical
literature. For instance, contrary to Alesina and Summers, Bade and Parkin find no correlation
between central bank independence and the variability of inflation. Next, unlike the prediction
of the Rogoff (1985) model,3 both Alesina and Summers and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
find no association between central bank independence and (the variability of) real output
growth.
In this paper on the basis of a single-stage Phillips-curve monetary policy game with
extrinsic uncertainty - i.e. supply shocks - we derive several propositions concerning the
The aWhurs are grateful fiir helplul comments by "I'hexi van Je Klundert, Mnarten van Raiij and an
anonymou.. referee. Of course, the usual dixlaimer applies. S.haling gratefully acknowlcdges financial
suppoR from the Netherlands Organiiauon for Scientific Research (NWO).
For an interesting survey of central banking in emerging marketorientcd economies see Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City (1990).
i For a survey of [he 'state of the art' see Cukierman (1993).
This (ramework is summarized in Alesina and Grilli (1991).2
relationship between central bank independence and (the variance of) inflation and output
growth. These propositions are tested for twelve industrial countries (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and
the U.S.) for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1991). In testing the game-theoretic model
we use several indices of central bank independence based on the central bank laws of these
countries.
The main conclusions of our paper can be summarized as follows. First of all, both our
model and estimation results, give further support to the well-known inverse relationship
between the degree of central bank independence and the level of inflation found by Alesina
(1988, 1989). Secondly, contrary to Alesina and Summers (1991) and Grilli, Masciandazo and
Tabellini (1991), we find no empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank is,
the lower the variability of inflation. Thirdly, our estimation results reject cleazly the proposition
- implied by the Rogoff (1985) model - of a positive relation between independence and the
variability of real output growth. In other words, inflation-averse central banks do no[ beaz the
costs of triggering recessions nor do politically sensitive central banks reap the benefits of
avoiding recessions. Finally, no empirical relationship can be found between central bank
independence and the level of real output growth in the long run. Hence, our empirical results
support the proposition of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) that having an independent
central bank is like having a free lunch. There are benefits (lower inFlation) but no appazent
costs in terms of real output growth.
The plan of this paper is as follows. [n section 2 we combine the Barro and Gordon (1983a)
Phillips-curve monetary policy game with the Alogoskoufis (1993) model of wage and employ-
ment determination, to allow for persistence in the natural rate of output. In section 3 we use
this model to analyse the theoretical relationships of central bank independence with the means
and variances of inflation and real output growth. Finally, in section 4 we confront the
propositions from the game-theoretic model with empirical evidence using the various indices
of central bank independence.
2 A SIMPLE CLOSED ECONOMY MACROMODEL
2.1 The Model
The main purpose of sections 2 and 3 is to combine the Barro and Gordon (1983a) Phillips
curve monetary policy game with the Alogoskoufis (1993) model of wage and employment
determination, to allow for persistence in the natural rate of output. Next, following Cukierman
(1993) chapter XVIII we use this model to analyse the effects of central bank independence on
the mean and variance of inflation and real output growth.
We assume that there are two types of agents, wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-
setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage every time period, and the central bank controls
monetary policy to determine the inflation rate.
The timing of events is as follows. Wage-setters sign annual nominal contracts (Gray (1976),
Fischer, (1977a)) at the beginning of each year, before monetary policy is chosen for that year.
Wage-setters know the domestic monetary regime, i.e. they know the weight of inflation
stabilization relative to employment stabilization in the preferences of the central bank. They3
take this information into account in forming their expectations. Finally, employment is
determined by competitive firms. We now move on to the supply side of the model.
2.2 Wuge und Employmcnr Derermina~ion
Consider the following supply block which is a closed-economy version of Alogoskoufis
(1993). Capital will be assumed fixed, and output is given by a short-run production function
of the following type
(2.1) yt - Re, t Itc o~s~l
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady state values4. Thus, y is
the log of output, P the log of employment, and ~ a measure of productivity. S is the exponent
of labour and is less than unity.
Having described the level of output, it remains to specify how productivity evolves over
time. We use a stochastic trend specification discussed in Stock and Watson (1988). This
specification says that over the long run productivity will grow at some average rate, labelled
g. However, shocks to productivity, vt", can cause productivity growth to deviate from its mean.
Moreover, these shocks are persistent with respect to the level of productivity: once perturbed
by an vtv shock, ~~ will show no tendency to return to its trendline. Hence, the supply shocks
are assumed to have permanent effects on the economy's productive capacity.s The
mathematical expression for the stochastic trend specification is a random walk with drift
(2.2) ~t - g f ~t-i f vtv
where g is the average (or expected) rate of growth of productivity (the drift of the ~.-process),
and v~` is a normally distributed productivity shock with zero mean and variance o1v.
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of labour to the real wage
wt - pt. This yields the following employment function
(2.3) et - I -1 a (wt - pt - ~)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p the log of the price level.
The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each period and remains fixed for one period.
The objective of wage setters is to stabilize employment around a target employment level 18 -
P.Denoting the log of the labour force by I5, we assume 1; c 1`Thuss we employ the insider-
outsider approach to the labour market (Blanchard and Summers ( 1986), Lindbeck and Snower
(1986))6. Thus, wages in each period are set to minimize
~ For a variable X say, x~ dfn)C
5 We discuss the impact of demand shocks in section 3.
6 The advantages of this approach will become clear in section 3.2.4
(2.4) Et-t (Pt - é)2
where F.~-I is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on information available at the
end of period t - l. The minimization of (2.4) is subject to the labour demand function (2.3).~
From the first-order conditions for a minimum of (2.4) subject to (2.3) the nominal wage
is given by
(2.5) w- Ft-t Pt f Et-t ~t -(1 - Q) P
Substituting (2.5) in the labour demand function (2.3), and the resulting equation in the
production function, we get the following relation between employment, output and unanticipated
shocks
(2.6)Pt - f t 1 1 S(Pt - Et-I pt f vt~`)
(2.7) Yt - QP } l~t } 1~ a(Pt - Ft-I Pt } ~t~)
An unanticipated rise in prices pt - F,~-I pt reduces the real wage, and causes firms to employ
more labour. Thus, both aggregate employment and output exhibit a transitory deviation from
their respective equilibrium or "natural" rates F and (if f utg.
On the other hand, an unanticipated shock to productivity increases the mazginal product of
labour, and given the real wage causes firms to employ more labour. Thus employment rises
above f, and output rises on account of both the higher employment (transitory effect) and the
higher productivity (permanent effec[).
Subtracting (2.6) from the labour force PS, using the approximation that the rate of
unemployment u- P` - P, and adding and subtracting pt-t we get the following
1 - Q,
expression for the short-run determination of unemployment.
(2.8) ut - u- 1 I R(Apt - F~-tOpt t a-t~`)
where u- PS - f and 0 is the first diference operator. u can be thought of as the equilibrium
of "natural" rate of unemployment in this model. Thus, (2.8) is the well known expectations
augmented "Phillips curve". Unemployment deviates from its equilibrium rate only to the extent
that there are unanticipated shocks to inflation or productivity. Anticipated shocks to inflation
and productivity are refelected in wages (equation (2.5)) and do not affect unemployment. We
Alternatively, the loss-function could be assumed quadratic in both the deviations ofemployment and the
real wage from certain target levels. For an analysis along these lines see Funke (1992).
M Aetual output and employment will equal their natural rates when all expectauons are fulfilled. Hence, the
natural rete of employment equals I and the natural rate of uutput is Q P t ftt.5
can nc,w incorporate the Phillips curve in a monetary policy game. This is the subject of the next
section.
3 A STATIC GAME BETWEEN WAGE-SETI'ERS AND THE CENTRAL BANK
3.1 The Sociul Welfare versus ~he Politicul Approach ~o Central Bank Behaviaur
In order to investigate optimal monetary policy - in which the inFlation rate is treated as a
directly controllable policy instrument9 - consider a central bank that is concerned with both
price stability and low unemployment. We assume a quadratic loss function, that penalizes both
inflation and unemployment. More specificly we use
(3.1) I,t - Z (Opt - op ~ )Z t 2Z (ut ' u ~ )2
where Op' and u' are the inflation and unemployment targets of the central bank. The parameter
d2 measures the weight of unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the
preferences of the central bank.
The central bank chooses ~p and wage-setters "choose" Et-tOpr Normalizing Op' and u'
at zero yields
.l I , d, , (..2) ~ - 2 (ppt)- . 2 (ut)-
According to Cukierman (1993), chapter III the recent literature on monetary policy games
has given two competing interpretations to the loss function of the monetary policymaker in
equation (3.1).
One part of the literature regards this function as a social welfare function and the central
bank as a benevolent social planner (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,
1983b), Rogoff ( 1985) and Canzoneri (1985)).
The other part views the central bank as a mediator between different interest groups that
try to push monetary policy in various directions. On this view, the loss function (3.1) reflects
a distributionally motivated political compromise mediated through the central bank between the
advocates of employment stimulation and the advocates of price stability (Weintraub (1978),
Burns (1979), Kane (1980, 1982), Beck ( 1982), Wooley ( 1984), Hetzel (1985), Havrilesky
(1987), Willet (1988) and Mayer (1990)). The ccefficient dZ then measures the relative political
clout of the two groups (Cukierman and Meltzer ( 1986a), Cukierman (1986)).
The social welfare approach seems best suited to describe how a central bank should behave.
However, (Cukierman ( 1993), chapter I[[) points out that it is a relatively weak paradigm for
explaining the actuul policies chosen by central banks. For as shown by Bade and Parkin ( 1988),
Alesina ( 1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini ( 1991) and Eijffinger and Schaling
(1992) in most countries central banks are highly dependent on the government in general and
9 Depending on operaung procedures the policymaker sets the money stock or the interest rate. However,
it is simpler to think of the central bank to choose inFlation direcdy. For a lucid ezposition of monetary
policy games with Ihe money stock as policy instruntent sez Can7vneri and Henderson (1991).6
the treasury or ministry of finance in particular. As a result, the policies implemented by central
bankers are not independent from the general polítical proces in which distributional
considerations are predominant. The impact of these considerations on the choice of policy varies
with the degree of central bank independence. The greater the political independence given to
the bank by law the smaller the impact of distributional and other political considerations on
monetary policy.
More realisticly, we choose the political approach to central bank behaviour as the
interpretation of equation (3.1). Hence we view the ccefficient d2 as a measure of the Dolitical
dependence of the central bank. The lower dZ the more independent the central bankfo. That
is, the degree of central bank independence equals dzt
3.2 Time Consistent lnflation Policy
Following Alogoskoufis ((1993), p. 17) we start with a cooperative game, i.e. we assume
that the natural rate of unemployment is efficient. [n the context of the model of sub-section 2.1,
this can be represented by the assumption that 1, the target employment level of wage-setters
is equal to I5, the effective labour force. In the latter case the central bank has no incentive to
try and reduce unemployment below its equilibrium rate. As there is no conflic[ between the
unemployment targets of wage setters and the central bank, the policy game can be seen as a
cooperative onet I. This state of affairs is summarized in the first column of table 1.
Tnble I






ut-o u~-u u'G u
Natural Rate Efficient Inefficient
Policy Game Cooperative Non-Cooperative
We now turn to the second column of table 1, i.e. the situation where the equilibrium
unemployment rate is inefficiently high. In what follows we show that then the equilibrium
in8ation rate becomes proportional to the natural rate of unemployment. In this case
discretionary monetary policy is no longer a Pareto-equilibrium, due to the time-inconsistency
of optimal monetary policy.
io An altemative approach is explicit modelling of the interaction of separate monetary and fiscal authorities.
See e.g. Alesina and Tabellini ( 1987) and Cukierman (1993), chapter XVIII.
~~ For a review of some imtxirtant concepts of game theory sae Blackburn and Christensen (1989).Assuming that j c 1` i.e. that u~ U the central bank has incentives to systematically create
inflation in order to reduce unemployment below its natural rate.
Substituting the Phillips curve (2.8) in the loss function (3.2) yields
(3.3) Lt -'~ (OPc)z t zz [u - 1 1 R Opc } 1~ QEc-tOPc - 1 1 S~]z
From the first order conditions for a minimum of (3.3), i.e. aL` - p, we obtain the central
bank's reaction function to wage-setter's expectations aOPt
dz(1 - R) dz dz t2 (3.4) Apt - ( I - a)z }
dz u } (1 - ~)z t dz
Ec-tAPc -
(1 - S)z t dz ~
Taking expectations conditional on information at t- l of (3.4) gives
d,
(3.5) G~-i OPt - u 1-a
Equation (3.5) is the reaction function of wage-setters. Upon substituting (3.5) in (3.4) we get
(3.6) ~pt - 1 dz ~ ti - dz ~i
(1 - a)z ' dz
Figure 1 shows the central bank's reaction functíon if vtw - 0, i.e. the average inflation rate
as a function of the expected inflation rate. t3
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The only point at which expectations are rational is at point N, which represents the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Denoting the average inflation rate by Ap~, from (3.6) it follows that
d
(3.7) ~pt - 1 z a i,
Hence, at point N the inflation rate is above zero (the outcome in the cooperative case).
Subtracting (3.5) from (3.6) we obtain the following expression for unanticipated inflation
d
(3.8) opt - E,-t~Pt -
(1 R)2 t dz ~
''- Demand shocks can be included in the analysis by extending the model with an aggregate-0emand curve.
This would complicate [he algebra without affecting our results.
'~ This figuro is based on a similar ona in Btanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 597.n
Upon substituting (3.8) in (2.8) we get
(3.9) u - u - 1 -R J`
(1 -Q)z t dz
Fquations (3.7) and (3.9) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy. The
monetary policy strategy of the central bank, i.e. equation (3.4) is time-consistent in the sense
that at each point in time the inflation rate selected is best, given the current situation. However,
as can be seen from equations (3.7) and (3.9), the resulting policy is socially sub-optimal. It is
sub-optimal since it results in an excessive level of inflation, i.e. it produces an inflationary bias
with no gains in the form of systematic lower unemployment. This completes the description of
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Resul~s fnr Inflarion and i~s Variance
Following Cukierman ((1993), chapter XVIII) in this section we investígate the effects of
central bank independence on the mean and variance of inflation. Taking the first derivative of
(3.7) with respect to dz, we get
(3.10) aop~ - ~ ~ o
ad2 1-Q
From (3.10) we derive proposition (3.1).
PROPOSITION 3.1: The more independent the central bank (the lower d~ the lower the
average inflation rate.
Note that the greater 1 (i.e., the greater the reduction in unemployment from
I-a
unanticipated inflation in the expectations augmented Phillips curve (2.8)) and the larger the
natural rate of unemployment the greater the inflation benefits of appointing independent central
bankers.
We now consider inflation variability. Upon taking variances of (3.6) we get
(3.11)
Var ~p~ - dz
(I - a)z ` dz




lim z - I
I..-, ~ (1 - Q)z ' dz9
That is, if the degree of central bank independence dz"~ equals zero no stabilization of inflation
is achieved. In this case, in fact Var Ap~ - az~, i.e. the variance of the productivity shock is
completely transmitted to inflation.
Taking the first derivative of (3.l l) with respect to dz, we get
(3.12)
a(Var ~ptla~) - 2dz(1 - Q)z
~ 0
Bdz [( l - ~3)2 ~, dz]3
From (3.12) we derive propostion 2:
PROPOSITION 3.2: The more independent the central bank (the lower d~ the lower the
variance of the inFlation rate.
By again differentiating (3.12) with respect to dz, we find that
(3.13)
az(VarOptlo~) - 2(l - Q)Z[(I - ~)z - 2dz]
adZ - [(1 - R)z t dz]a
By setting [( I-~B)z - 2dz] equal to zero we find a
Using (3.12) and (3. l3) we obtain Figure 2.
point of inflection at dz - (1 - S)z ta.
2
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
From Figure 2 we derive propostion 3.3.
PROPOSITION 3.3: Ifa highly independent central bank loses some of its independence at first
this will strongly increase inflation variability. in this respect loss of independence matters less
for weaker institutions.
ia ll 1 z
Following Blanchard and Fisher (1989, p. 598) ~~[( l,d ~)] is, laosely speslcing a
2
measurc of the utility gain from unexpected innation: 1 1 S gives the decrease in unemployment (sae
r.quation (2.8)), and Ild, the utility loss from higher inflation. Hence, at the point of inflxtion tàis utility gain
equals I12.10
This completes the description of the results on the mean and variance of inflation.
3.4 Resull.rfar Owpui and i~s Vuriance
In this sub section, we examine the effects of central bank independence on the mean and
variance of real output (growth).
Adding and subtracting 1 S~ pt t from (2.7) yields
(3.14) Yt - S 1 f kt f 1 R S (OPt - Fc-I OPt f~`t)
If we employ yt as short-hand for Sf f pt we get
(3.15) Yt - Yt - 1 R S (~Pt - Ft-t~Pt '~)
Equation (3.15) is the famous Lucas surprise supply function which says that unanticipatied
inflation andlor productivity shocks cause transitory deviations of output from its equilibrium
(mean) level y.
Upon sustituting (3.8) in (3.15) we get
(3.16) Yt- Y-
R(1 - Q) ~
(1 - ~)z ` dz
From (3.16) it follows that the mean level of output is independent from dz, i.e. independent
from the prevailing monetary regime. Ofcourse, this result is just a corrollary of the natural rate
property of the Alogoskoufis ( 1993) supply blockts.
Taking variances of (3.16) yields
var(y2 - y) - r R(1 Z R) ~1 z
(3.17)
IL J a~ (1 - ~) ` dz
From (3.17) it follows that
lim ~ f R(1 - R) 1 z- 0
(3.18) IL(1 - ~)z ' d J d z z
That is, ifthe degree of ccntral bank independence dz-t equals zero perfect stabilization ofoutput
is achieved. In this case, in fact Var (yt - yt) - 0.
Taking the first derivative of (3.17) with respect to dz we get
~5 For instance, introducing multiperiod wage cnntracts (Fischer (1977b)), would imply pnlicy non-neutrality.
In the latter case [he degree of central bank independence would show an inverse relation with the level
of output.(3.19)
I1
a[Var(Y~ - Yc)la~) - -2Q2(1 - Q)Z
adz [(1 - p)2 - dz)s
From (3.19) we derive proposition 3.4.
~ 0
PROPOSITION 3.4: The more independent the central bank (the lower dZ) the higher the
variance of output around its mean or natural level y.
Note that if y~ - 0(e.g. Alesina and Grilli (1991)) proposition 3.4 is a statement about the
actual variance of output. This is not the case in the present analysis. Actually the persistence
of productivity shocks is inherited by the natural rate of output (c.f. Cukierman ( 1993), chapter
XV).
We have
(3.20) Yc - ~e f ki
Hence
(3.21) Y~-~ - Sé } kc-~
Upon substituting (2.2) in (3.20) we get
(3.22) Y~ - Qe f kc-t f g t v~w
Combíníng (3.22) with (3.21) yields
(3.23) Y~ - Yc-t f g f v~w
Therefore in the present analysis the natura) rate of output follows a random walk with drift.
It is around this "walking" natural rate that output is being stabilized.
Again differentiating (3.19) with respect to dZ we find that
(3.24)
a2[Var(y~ - Y~)la~) - 6aZ(1 -Q)Z ~ 0
t3d2 [(1 - ~)z ` d,)4
Using (3.19) and (3.24) we obtain Figure 3.
[1NSERT F[GURE 3)
This completes the description of the results on the mean and variance of output.12
Now we move from levels to growth rates, i.e. we now examine the effects of central bank
independence on the growth rate of output and its variance. Taking first differences of (3.16)
we get
(3.25) Ay~ - Dy~ - R(1 - R) Ovv
(1 - R)z ' dz
From (3.23) we derivc proiwsition 3.5.
PROPOSITION 3.5: The mean or average rate of growth of output (py~) is independent from
the prevailing monetary regime (dz).
Taking variances of (3.25) we get
Var(Ayc - A`yi) - r ~(1 -~) l z
(3.26) IL I
o~
where aoNZ - Var ~~~ - Q'- t az . Since (3.26) is simular to (3.17) the same discussion
k a,-~
applies. Hence
PROPOSITION 3.6: The more dependent the central bank (the higher dz) the lower the
variance of the growth rate of output around its mean or average rate of growth.
Finally, we summarize the main propositions from this section in table 2
[INSERT TABLE 2]
In order to confront these propositions with some cross-country evidence we can now move on
to empirical testing. This the subject of the next section.
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
4.1 Centra! Bank Independence and rhe Level of Inflarion
According to Alesina ( 1988, 1989) and Alesina and Summers ( 1991) countries with an
independent central bank will have a lower rate of inflation than countries with a dependent
central bank. As stated in section 1, this well-known inverse relationship between central bank
independence and the level of inflation is particularly sensitive to the numerical values of the
various indices of central bank independence.
Furthermore, the negative corcelation between central bank independence and inflation dces
az ( i - Q)z ` dz13
not necessarily imply a causal relation from central bank independence to inflation or the other
way around. The correlation could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and tradition
of monetary stability in a country, leading both to an independent central bank and a low rate
of inflation.lb As an example could be taken Germany, for which country one could argue that
the hyperinFlation in the 1920s caused such a culture and tradition of monetary stability.l~
However, in our opinion the degree of central bank independence is the ultimate cause of
the level of inflation. For central bank independence is the ability and willingness to conduct an
autonomous monetary policy directed at price stability as the single policy goal. If not seriously
hampered by other elements of economic policy, such as wage increases, budget deficits and
government debt, it will eventually lead to low sustainable inflation.
Therefore, our regression analysis (OLS method) assumes the various indices of central bank
independence to be the explanatory variables of the average inflation (CPI) on an annual base
in the twelve countries considered (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Switserland, the UK, the US and Sweden):
(-)
(4.1) average inflation - ap f at. central bank independence t et
We investigated empirically the policy independence index of Bade and Parkin (BP), the
index of Alesina (AL)18, the broad index of political independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (GMT) and a new index of policy independence, which we call the Eijffinger -
Schaling (ES) index.19 The ES-index of central bank independence is compart~ with previous
indices (BP, AL, and GMT) in Eijffingerand Schaling (1993). This cross-sec[ion analysis of the
empirical relation between these indices of central bank independence and the level of inflation
should be interpreted carefully because of the limited degrees of freedom.
The relationship between the varions indices and average annual inflation is analysed for the
whole post-Bretton-Woods period of twenty years (1972-1991). During the fixed exchange rate
system of Bretton-Woods countries were fully committed to an exchange rate target and had no
room to conduct and autonomous domestic monetary policy. Thus, before 1972 the empirical
relation between central bank independence and inflation was much less straightforward than
after 1972.Zo
Furthermore, the post-Bretton-Woods period is divided in two sub-periods of ten years each
16 According to the Commission of the European Communities (1990) p. 98 the causal relatioa implied by their
regression analysis runs from inflation to central bank independence. This is certainly incorrect.
n See Bresciani-Turroni (1953).
IS In Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) wa show that the Alesina (1988, 1989)synthetic indicatorofcentral bank
independence is intemally inconsistent and does not qualify as an index.
19 In the case of the GMT index, there is no ranking for Sweden and so the sample is only made up of eteven
countries.
Za Regression analysis by De Haan and Sturm (1992), pp.308-309 empirically supports this view.14
(1972-1981 and 1982-1991 respectively) in order to distinguish between the EMS countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, [taly, the Netherlands and partly the UK) and non-EMS countries
(Australia, Canada, lapan, Switserland, the US and Sweden). Before 1982 the EMS countries
participated - some like France, Italy and the UK only partly - in the snake arrangement and -
except the UK - in the initial orientation phase of the EMS (1979-1982) which was characterized
by frequent and large realisments of central rates. After 1982 a period of consolidation (1982-
1987) can be disccrned within the EMS. According to Ungever (1990), this period was marked
by "... a widespread consensus to follow stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence
in the development of costs, prices and monetary aggregates, and by long periods without rea-
lignments of central rates" (p. 338).2t
Consequently, during the second sub-period (1982-1991) the negative correlation between
central bank independence and inFlation is expected to be less clear cut than during the first sub-
period (1972-1981) because of the consolidation in the EMS countries towards exchange rate
stability. From 1982 the domestic monetary policy in these countries - besides Germany as the
anchor country - could have become íncreasingly endogenous by focussing on the exchange rate
target.
'-~ Ungerer (1990) makes a distinction between three phases of development of the EMS: the first phase (1979-
1982) as a perial of initial orientation, the second phase (1982-1987) as a period ofconsotidation and the third
phase (1987-present) as a period of re-exantination, in the light of uneasiness about the 'asyrnmetry' of the
system.15
TiihJe d .i~~era,~r nnnuul iiJlmiun nnd d~r ~~ariu~~c iiidicer ~~f'i.riurnl Gru~k irulrpri~drnee.
Ex Ianatory variables I972-1991 1972-1981 1982-1991
Constant II.S46 15.025 8.068
(tí.931) (6.579) (S.S34)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -I.8S0 -2.252 -t.449
(-2.850j~ (-2.531j (-2.SSOj
Adj. RZ 0.393 0.329 0.333
RMSE I .939 2.658 1.697
Constant 11.778 15.358 8.199
(8.205) (7.686) (tí.302)
Alesina (AL) -1.981 -2.432 -1.529
(-3.501)~~ (-3.088j~ (-2.962j~
Adj. R'- O.S06 0.437 0.418
RMSE 1.750 2.435 1.586
Constant 8.822 12.481 5.162
(5.686) (tí.3I5) (4.013)
Grilli et.sl. (GMT) -0.395 -0.846 -0.243
(Political) (-1.380) (-1.683) (-0.743)
Adj. RZ 0.083 0.155 -0.047
RMSE 2.456 3.129 2.036
Conshnt Il.Ol4 14.383 7.645
(9.998) (9.144) (7.604)
Eijffinger-Schaling -1.433 -1.746 -1.119
(ES) (-3.9SSj~ (-3.376j~ (-3.386)~~
Adj. R2 0.571 0.486 0.488
RMSE 1.630 2.327 1.488
Notes: t-values are ia parenthesrs. One asterisk indicates that the ccefficient is significantly differeat from zero at
a 9596 wnfidence level and lwo asterisks indicate that the caefficient is siguificant at a 999ó confidence
level.
Table 3 shows the estimation result of equation (4.1), which explains average annual
inFlation by the four indices of central bank independence for the whole period (1972-1991) and
for both sub-periods (1972-1981 and 1982-1991) respectively. Except for the GMT index of
political independence, the inverse relationship between inflation and central bank independence
is very clear, although the Alesina and FS index proved to be more significant (higher t-value)16
than the BP index.22 In case of the latter three indices, central bank independence is less
significant (lower t-value) during both sub-periods than during the whole post-Bretton-Woods
period.
Besides the GMT index, the various indices have approximately the same significance in both
the first and second sub-period, while that in the second sub-period was expected to be lower
than in the first as a consequence of the six EMS countries within the sample of twelve. These
outcomes could be the result of the practice that most EMS countries used fully the bilateral
band of f 2'k~ and, for Italy and since October 1990 the UK, the band of tóq. Only the
Netherlands and, from 19~6, also France had an explicit exchange rate target for their currency
vis-3-vis the Deutsche Mark.
What may be conluded from the cross-section analysis of these twelve countries regarding
the relationship between central bank independence and the level of inflation and the quality of
the four indices of central bank independence in particulaz?
Firstly, the negative relation between central bank independence and inflation proved to be
very significant for all indices, except for the GMT index of political independence.~ Clearly,
the more independent a central bank is, the lower rate of inflation in the long run.
[INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5]
Figure 4 shows that the BP index of policy independence has a significant, negative relation to
average annual inFlation despite some positive outiiers (Italy and the UK) and some negative
(Belgium and the Netherlands). The ranking by Bade and Pazkin of the latter two countries is
evidently too low. Furthermore, from figure 5 it can be seen that the Alesina 'index' has a more
significant, negative relation to inflation, merely by the ad hoc adjusted ranking of Italy.
[1NSERT FIGURES 6 AND 7]
However, figure 6 shows that the GMT index bears no clear (negative) relation to inflation
in most of the eleven countries considered. This could be explained by the broadness of the
GMT index comprising many features (see Eijfffinger and Schaling (1992)). This index, thereby,
waters down the essential features of policy independence, i.e. (i) the procedures for appointing
the central bank board, (ii) the relationship between, the central bank and government conceming
the formulation of monetary policy, and (iii) the policy goals of the central bank regarding
monetary policy making.
Finally, figure 7 shows that the ES index has an even more significant, negative relation to
,2 De Haan and Sturm (1992) find Jifferent empiricat results for a mcxlitied GMT index, meatiuring froth poliucal
and economic independence '... except for the etttries which are rolated to supervision of the banking system.
Whett~er or not a central bank has any responsibility for bank supervision provides, in our view, no informatioo
as to its independence' (p. 323).
This is a consequence of the 'broadness' of the GMT-indrx. Because GMT use eight criteria in determining
the degree of political inJCpendrnce, the exsential characteristics of central bank independence are watere.l
down. See Eijffinger and Schaling (1992), pp. l I-12.17
inflation, although the positive outliers (Italy and the UK) remain. This could, perhaps, be
explained by the half-fledged position of these countries with respect to the EMS. Nevertheless,
the negative outliers (Belgium and the Netherlands) of the BP and Alesina index disappeared by
the more consistent ranking of both countries according to their central bank laws within the
context of monetary policy making.
Consequently, empirical evidence on the various indices of central bank independence
supports Proposition 3.1 (see sub section 3.3) that the more independent the central bank - the
lower d2 - is, the lower the average inflation rate.
Ofcourse, one should be well aware of the more or less subjective character of the research
on central bank independence, which combines both legal-institutional and political-economic
criteria and features in constructing indices.
4.2 Ceniral Bank Indeperulence and rhe variability of Infla~ion
The variability of inflation reFlects the degree of monetary and inflationary uncertainty in the
economy.
Inflationary uncertainty implies that investers are not sure about the expected (ex ante) future
level of inflation and, hence, about expected (ex ante) real interest rates. Therefore, they are less
willing to take risks and to invest in either long-term financial assets or physical capital goods.
As a consequence lenders demand a higher risk premium on their funds.24 Thus, higher
inflationary unccrtainty - measured by the variability of realized inflation - will lead to higher
expected real interest rates and to lower levels of investment and output growth.
What is the empirical relationship between central bank independence and the variability of
inflation?
First ofall, the variability of inflation is positively correlated with the level of inflation and,
thereby, wi[h the independence of central banks. Chowdhury (1991) investigated empirically the
relation between the level and variability of inflation in 66 countries for the period from 1955
to 1985. He concluded that there is a significant, positive correlation between the level and the
variability of inflation during this period. De Haan and Sturm (1992) also examined this relation
in 18 industrial countries for the period from 1961 to 1987. They found a clear, positive
correlation between both variables for the post-Bretton-Woods sub-periods 1970-1978 and 1979-
1987, but not for the sub-period 1961-1969. Consequently, if a high degree of central bank
independence results in a low level of inflation, this should also lead to a low variability of
inflation. Nevertheless, the negative correlation between independence and inflation variability
dces not necessarily imply a causal relation from the first to the latter, but could be explained
by a third factor. However, our regression analysis assumes the various indices of central bank
independence (BP, AL, GMT and FS) to be[he explanatory variables of the variance of monthly
inflation (CPI) on an annual base in the twelve countries of our sample:
24 Empirical resesrch with respect to the inFluence of monetary and inFlationary uncertainty on real interest rates
in the United States is conducted by Mascaro and Meltzer (1983). They conclude that monetary uncertaínty -
measured by the variability of money growth - resulted in a risk premium for bo[h the money aod capital
market interest rate in the period from October 1979.18
(-)
(4.2) variance inflation - bo f bt, central bank independence f n,
Again, the relationship between the various indices and the variance of monthly inflation is
examined for the complete post-Bretton-Woods period of twenty years (1972-1991) and its two
sub-periods of ten years (1972-1981 and 1982-1991). During the second sub-period the negative
correlation between central bank independence and inflation variability is also expected to be less
clear cut than during the first sub-period by the consolidation of EMS countries to exchange rate
stability.
Table 4 Variance momhly irflarion atul rhe ~nrious Duiices ojcenrra! bank irudepei~denee.
Explanatory variables 1972-1991 1972-1981 1982-1991
Constant 0.326 0.289 0.214
(1.343) (0.749) (2.453)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -0.007 0.034 -0.023
(-0.070) (0.225) (-0.680)
Adj. RZ -0.100 -0.095 -0.051
RMSE 0.283 0.449 O.I02
Constant 0.330 0.298 0.206
(1.422) (0.809) (2.458)
Alesina (AL) -0.008 0.030 -0.020
(-0.090) (0.209) (-0.607)
Adj. RZ -0.099 -0.095 -0.061
RMSE 0.283 0.449 0.102
Constant 0.577 0.771 0.217
(3.741) (3.004) (5.928)
Gnlli et.al. (GMT) -0.080 -0.118 -0.023
(Political) (-2.044) (-L802) (-2.480)~
Adj. RZ 0.241 0.184 0.340
RMSE 0.244 0.406 0.058
Constant 0.391 0.421 0.218
(2.068) (1.385) (3.239)
Eijffinger-Schaling -0.029 -0.018 -0.022
(ES) (-0.472) (-0.183) (-0.976)
Adj. RZ -0.076 -0.096 -0.004
RMSE O ?80 ~i.449 0.099
Notes: t-values are in parenthrses. One asterisk indicate.e that the coefficient is signiticantly different frotn zero at
a 9556 confidence level and two asterisks indicate thxt the coefticient is signiticant at a 9946 confidence
Itvel.19
"Cable 4 shows the outcomes of equation (4.2) explaining the variance of monthly inflation by
the four independence indices. The inverse relationship between inflation variability and central
bank independence is only significant for the GMT index, in particular for the second sub-period
(!), but not for the other indices.'-5 Generally, the latter indices do not support, except for the
GMT index, Proposition 3.2 that the more independcnt the central bank - the lower d2 - is, the
lower the variance of the intlation rate.
4.3 Cenrral Bank lndependence and the Level of Output Growth
Given the inverse relationship between central bank independence and the level of inflation -
see sub-section 4.1 - one could argue that the expected (ex ante) level of inflation influences
expected (ex ante) real interest rates and, thereby, the level of output growth according to the
Mundell-Tobin effect. A rise in expected inflation will lead - by Mundell (1963) - to substitution
of liquid assets by long-term financial assets and - according to Tobin (1965) - to substitution
of liquid assets by physical capital goods, lowering the marginal efficiency of capital, and will
result in a decrease of expected real interest rates. Thus, more independent central banks will
mitigate intlationary expectations inducing hígher expected real interest rates and lower levels
of investment and output growth.2ó
However, Proposition 3.5 (in sub-section 3.4) states that the mean or average rate ofgrowth
of output is independent from the prevailing monetary regime (d2). Therefore, our regression
analysis assumes the four indices of central bank independence (BP, AL, GMT and FS) to be
the explanatory variables ofaverage output growth (volume of GDP) on an annual base, without
postulating an expected sign for these variables:
(4.3) average output growth - co f ct. central bank independence f t9t
Again, we examined the relationship between the various indices and level of real output growth
for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1990) and its two sub-periods ( 1972-1981 and 1982-
1990).
~ Our estimation results for the BP index are according with Bade and Pankin (198g). However, they contradict
the findings of Alesina and Summers (1991) who averaged the Alesina index and the GMT index of political
and economic independence.
26 Nevertheless, in thaory it could be argued that a higher degree of cCntral bank independence results in lower
intlationary uncertainty leacJing to a dtarrase of expected real interrst rates and, thereby, to an increase of
investment and output growth. Empirical evidance in sub-section 4.2 rejects tha first link of this transmission
muhanism.zo
lirhlr ? ~lrrra,tr nnnurd umpur ~ruu~dr nml du- rurinu.r inrlirr.~ uf rrnnvl herrk imlrprndrrrrr.
Explanatory variables 1972-1990 1972-1981 1982-I990
Constant 3.039 3.459 2.575
(4.563) (4.191) (4.428)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -0.164 -0.366 0.061
(-0.630) (-1.139) (0.269)
Adj. RZ -0.058 0.026 -0.092
RMSE 0.775 0.960 0.677
Constant 3.064 3.153 2.567
(4.843) (4.532) (4.627)
Alesina (AL) -0.177 -0.396 0.065
(-0.710) (-L295) (0.299)
Adj. RZ -0.047 0.058 -0.090
RMSE 0.771 0.945 0.676
Constant 3.153 3.I13 3.202
(6.653) (4.900) (8.046)
Grilli et.al. (GMn -0.129 -0.137 -0.122
(Political) (-1.073) (-0.848) (-1.203)
Adj. R'- 0.015 -0.029 0.043
RMSE 0.750 1.006 0.630
Constant 3.268 3.627 2.870
(6.708) (6.221) (6.293)
Eijffinger-Schaling -0.227 -0.383 -0.054
(ES) (-1.419) (-1.999) (-0.359)
A~j. R` 0.084 0.214 -0.086
R64SE 0.7?1 0.863 0.675
Notes: t-vahtes arc in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the wCfticient is significantly different from zero at
a 9596 confidenct level and two astzrisks indicate that the coefficient is sígnificant at a 9996 confidence
level.
Table 5 shows the estimation results of equation (4.3). The relationship between real output
growth and central bank independence proves to be insignificant, except for the ES index in the
first sub-period. The BP and AL index also have higher t-values for the first sub-period than for2l
the second.27 These outcomes could be explained by relatively more restrictive monetary
policies by independent central banks during the late 1970s - the high-days of monetary targeting
- which resulted in a lower level of economic growth.
In general, empirical evidence on the various indices dces support Proposition 3.5 stating
that there is no relation between central bank independence and average real output growth. In
other words, although a high degree of central bank independence is associated with a low level
of inflation in the long run, it has no large costs or benefits in terms of real economic growth.
Thus, in countries with an independent central bank no trade offcan be found between inflation
on the one hand and economic growth and unemployment on the other hand in the long term.
4.4 Central Bank Independence and the Variability of Otuput Growth
What is the relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the variability
of real output growth? According to Rogoff (1985) independent central banks purchase a lower
level of inflation at the price of a higher variability of real economic growth. By relying more
on rules rather than discretion in policy making they tolerate more cyclical variability of
economic growth. Consequently, Rogoff's conclusion corresponds very well with our Proposition
3.6 (see sub-section 3.4) stating that the more dependent the central bank - the higher d2 - is,
the lower the variance of the growth rate of output around its mean or average rate of growth.
Again, our regression analysis assumes the various independence indices (BP, AL, GMT and
ES) to be the explanatory variables of the variance of monthly output growth (volume of GDP)
on an annual base, postulating a positive sign for these variables:
( f)
(4.4) variance output growth - do f dt. central bank independence f Kt
The empirical relationship between the four indices and the variability of real output growth is
investigated also for the four independence indices. The ccefficient for the BP and AL index do
not have the expected, positive sign in any sample period. Besides, none of the ccefficients
appears to be significantly different from zero. The t-values prove to be the highest for the GMT
index.2S These estimation results imply, of course, that a higher degree of central bank
independence dces not lead to more variability of real economic growth, rejecting Proposition
3.6 quite clearly.
Therefore, having an independent central bank dces not result in more variable inflation (see
27 These estimation results tiir the AL and ES index correspond with De Haan and Sturm (1992). They are also
in accordance with Ale.,ina and Summars (1991) and De Long and Summers (1992) for their "single overall
index' hased on an average of the Alesina and GMT pulitical and econontic independence index. It should be
noticul that De Long and Summers (I992) tind, however, a positive relationship between central bank
independence and economic growth, controlling for initial GDP per worker levels (see in this respect their chart
6 on p. Ití).
'x Our empirical evidence for thc AL end ES indax is in accordance with lhat uf Dc Haan and Sturm (1992).
Ale,eina and Summers (1991) xnd De Long and Summers (1992) also find for thair averaged Alesina-GMT
index no support with respect to the relation t~etween independence and tha variability of output growth. The
same holds for its relationship regarding the average and variance of unemployntent rates.zz
sub-section 4.2) nor in more variable economic growth in the short term. So, inllation-averse
central banks do not trigger off recessions nor do politically sensitive central hanks avoid
recessions.
Tablr 6 Vnrirmce n~onrhly uurpw growrh nnd rhr vnrious indiree ojrenrru! bnnk independence.
Explanatory variahles 1972-1990 1972-1981 1982-1990
Constant 1.812 2.898 0.961
(2.901) (2.037) (2.620)
Bade-Parlcin (BP) -0.232 -0.419 -0.114
(-0.954) (-0.756) (-0.781)
Adj. RZ -0.008 -0.041 -0.037
RMSE 0.727 1.656 0.436
Constant 1.731 2.777 0.897
(2.877) (2.036) (2.473)
Alesina (AL) -0.202 -0.376 -0.080
(-0.852) (-0.699) (-0.563)
Adj. R2 -0.026 -0.049 -0.066
RMSE 0.733 l .662 0.442
Constant 0.784 0.889 0.406
(1.748) (0.837) ( 1.633)
Grilli et.al. (GMT) O.114 0.265 0.070
(Political) (0.996) (0.981) (1.110)
Adj. R'- -0.001 -0.004 0.023
RMSE 0.710 1.681 0.394
Constant 1.203 1.375 0.840
(2.345) (1.209) (2.803)
Eijffinger-Schaling 0.018 0.185 -0.049
(ES) (0.104) (0.496) (-0.497)






Noles: t-values are in parenthesrs. One asterisk indicates Ihat [he coefficient is significandy different from zero at
a 9596 confidence level and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at a 9996 confidence
level.
4.5 Conclusion
The main conclusions of this theoretical and empirical analysis of central bank independence
with respect to the level and vaziability of inflation and economic growth aze the following.
First of all, both our model and estimation results, give further support to the well-known
inverse relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the level of inflation23
found by Alesina (1988, 1989). However, it should be emphasized that these results are
particularly sensitive to the numerical values of indices. For example, the GMT index shows no
clear inverse relation to inflation, whereas the ES index proves to have a very significant,
negative relation.
Secondly, contrary to Alesina and Summers (1991) we find no empirical evidence - except
for the GMT index - supporting our proposition that the more independent the central bank is,
the lower the variability of inFlation.
Thirdly, according to our proposition that the level of economic growth dces not depend on
the prevailing monetary regime, no relationship can be found between central bank independence
and the level of real output growth in the long run. Our interpretation of this outcome is that the
attainment and maintenance of low inFlation by an independent central bank is not accompanied
by large costs or benefits in terms of sustainable economic growth. The absence of a long-run
trade off between inflation and growth implies that the establishment of central bank
independence in countries, which did not use to have this, is a free lunch.
Fourthly and finally, our estimation results reject clearly the proposition of a positive relation
between independence and the variability of real output growth. An independent central bank
dces not lead to more variable economíc growth in the short run. [n other words, inflation-
averse central banks do not bear the costs of triggering recessions nor do politically sensitive
central banks reap the benefits of the avoiding recessions.
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